

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00655 01 OF 03 081209Z

21

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 111208

O 080700Z FEB 76 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6875

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 AMMAN 0655

NODIS

STADIS //

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, US, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET ARMS FOR JORDAN, US PROGRAMS AND HEAVY-LIFT
HELICOPTERS

REF: AMMAN 0604

SUMMARY: SOVIET HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTER AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
ARMS OFFER WILL BE AMONG MAIN ISSUES OF KING HUSSEIN'S MARCH
VISIT TO US. REASONS FOR JORDANIAN CONCERN ARE: (1)
FUTURE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT PRICE
INCREASES; (2) RESENTMENT OVER JORDANIAN INCREASINGLY
"SECOND-CLASS STATUS" VIS A VIS ISRAEL IN MILITARY
ASSISTANCE; (3) FEAR OF POWER OF ISRAELI LOBBY TO BLOCK
US PROGRAMS FOR JORDAN AS RESULT OF HAWK CONTROVERSY;
AND (4) DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NO VIETNAM EQUIPMENT (F-5E'S) IS
AVAILABLE FOR JORDA, SOVIET ARMS FLIRTATION INVOLVES
DUAL MOTIVATION: ELEMENTS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
BARGAINING BUT ALSO REAL DOUBTS OVER CONTINUING US
POLITICAL AND ARMS SUPPLY RELIABILITY. SOVIET OFFER OF
HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS (AND TO A LESSER EXTENT FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT) IS IMMEDIATE ISSUE. WE SEE ON HELICOPTERS THREE
OPTIONS: (A) MAINTAIN CURRENT USG POSITION (RELEASE SIX PLUS
HELOS FOR COMMERCIAL SALE), WITH STRONG POSSIBILITY
GOJ WOULD ALSO ACQUIRE SOME SOVIET HELICOPTERS AND
SOVIET TECHNICIANS; (B) PROVIDE 4 TO 6 HELICOPTERS FOR SALE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00655 01 OF 03 081209Z

FROM US INVENTORY IMMEDIATELY, WITH REMAINDER IN OUT-

YEAR US GRANT OR SAUDI-FINANCED CREDIT PROGRAM. THIS WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR US EFFORT BUT, ALONG WITH US CONTINUING REPRESENTATIONS AND WARNINGS TO GOJ, WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET DEAL; (C) US AGREEMENT TO HELP OBTAIN SAUDI FINANCING FOR FUTURE HELICOPTER PURCHASE, IN PLACE OF SOVIETS. WE RECOMMEND OPTION B, OR AS A FALL-BACK OPTION C IF SAUDI APPROACH DEEMED ADVISABLE AND POSSIBLE. IN ANY CASE AND AT MINIMUM WE SHOULD AGREE TO RELEASE HELICOPTERS ON BASIS OF RJAF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND AS PART OF ONGOING MAP OR FMS CREDIT PROGRAM, THOUGH THIS WILL NOT ELIMINATE SOVIET DEAL PERHAPS ON BASIS OF "CIVIL AIR" HELICOPTERS ROLE ONLY. HELICOPTER ISSUE, HOWEVER WE MAY THINK ILL-ADVISED, IS NOW A CENTRAL QUESTION IN US-GOJ RELATIONS AND WE NEED TO SHOW GOJ THROUGH COMBINATION OF CONTINUED STERN WARNINGS OF CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET DEAL AND A REAL EFFORT AT ACCOMMODATION TO SHOW THEM WE TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

1. AS PROMISED REFTEL, WE HAVE EXAMINED THE SOVIET ARMS OFFER TO JORDAN AND HAVE DEVELOPED AN ASSESSMENT, SOME OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. THIS ISSUE WILL BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE SPECIFIC BILATERAL QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE KING DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT.

2. ASSESSMENT: JORDAN HAS NEVER BEEN COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH ITS MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. DIFFERENCES OVER THE PROGRAMS WE HAVE PROVIDED, THEIR SIZE, AND THE PRICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN A LONG-STANDING PROBLEM. INDEED, THE JORDANIANS, LIKE SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNERS, HAVE ALWAYS SET UNREASONABLY LARGE TARGETS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY COULD GET US TO TRY HARDER AS A RESULT AND THEREFORE GET MORE FROM US. THIS PROCESS HAS INDEED BEEN WORKING WELL FOR THEM WITH RATHER LARGE INCREASES IN OUR REQUESTS TO CONGRESS IN RECENT YEARS, REFLECTED, EVEN AFTER CUTS BY CONGRESS, IN LARGER PROGRAMS BEING RECEIVED BY JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS KNOW OUR PROCESS WELL, COUNT ON SOME LEVEL OF CUTS, (BUT LOOK CLOSELY AT COMPARATIVE LEVELS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00655 01 OF 03 081209Z

FOR OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY ISRAEL) AND ARE GRATIFIED ABOUT GETTING INCREASES. AS WITH MANY ARABS, AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERNERS, THERE ARE CERTAIN JOYS WHICH ALSO EMERGE FROM THE SHEER PROCESS OF BARGAINING.

3. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A RATHER GENUINE CONCERN OVER SUCH ISSUES AS COMPLETELY UNPREDICTED PRICE INCREASES WHICH EXCEED 50 PER CENT OF EARLIER

QUOTED FIRM PRICES, THE NEAR TERM AVAILABILITY OF SOME ITEMS, US SLOWNESS IN THE RELEASE OF OTHERS, AND WHAT HAS BEEN FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE FAR FROM EXEMPLARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM BY THE US GOVERNMENT (I.E., LITTLE INFORMATION FLOW, SLOW PREPARATION OF LETTERS OF OFFER, RAPID CHANGES OF PRICING AND RELEASE POLICY, ETC.).

4. THEY COMPARE THIS WITH WHAT THEY THINK THEY KNOW ABOUT US PROGRAMS FOR ISRAEL AND FIND THEMSELVES IN A SECOND-CLASS STATUS. THEY INTERPRET THE US EFFORTS AS ASSIGNING THEM TO A LESSER POSITION AND OFTEN CONCLUDE EITHER THAT WE HAVE SOME SORT OF DISCRIMINATION IN MIND TOWARDS THEM OR THAT WE ARE TRYING TO SEND THEM A POLITICAL SIGNAL. WHAT HAS BEEN MORE DIFFICULT IS THE EXPERIENCE WITH SALES PROGRAMS. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO BLOCK THE HAWK PROGRAM HAVE LED THEM TO CONCLUDE THE THE ISRAELIS HAVE OBTAINED AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM TO VETO THEIR PURCHASES WHEN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS THEY HAVE CONVINCED THE WEALTHY AARABS TO SUPPORT JORDANIAN CASH PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE US HAS THUS BECOME IN THEIR VIEW INCERASINGLY UNRELIABLE. AND WHILE THEIR PRESENT EQUIPMENT INVENTORY IS FULLY TIED TO US FOR SPARE PARTS AND MOST AMMUNITION SUPPORT, FOR THE FIRST TIME JORDANIANS AT HIGH LEVELS ARE THINKING ABOUT DIVERSIFICATION ON THE PREMISE THE US WILL BE GROWING LESS RATHER THAN MORE RELIABLE.

5. THE MAJOR POINT THEN IS THAT JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO REACT TO SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF WEAPON'S PURCHASES ARE DERIVED FROM A COMBINATION OF FACTORS-- ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT US UNRELIABILITY, AND EFFORTS TO TRY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00655 01 OF 03 081209Z

TO MAKE US (AND PERHAPS ALSO SAUDIS WHO THEMSELVES ARE FEARFUL OF GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE) TAKE NOTICE AND PERHAPS RAISE THE ANTE. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE INOUR JUDGMENT TO ASSUME THIS IS PURELY A BARGAINING SITUATION, ALTHOUGH ELEMENTS OF BARGAINING ARE ALSO PRESENT AS JORDANIANS ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE BENEFITS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP AS AN EARNEST OF US POLITICAL INTEREST IN JORDAN. OUR REACTION SHOULD BE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00655 02 OF 03 081039Z

12

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 110929

O 080700Z FEB 76 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6876

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 AMMAN 0655

NODIS

STADIS//////////

PREMISED ON TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DUAL MOTIVATION
ON THE PART OF THE KING AND JORDAN.

6. THE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS CONCERNS MAINLY HEAVY-
LIFT HELICOPTERS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ALSO A SIGNIFICANT CON-
CERN ABOUT ADDITIONAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE VIETNAM EQUIPMENT
ISSUE AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IS SO DEEPLY FELT HERE BECAUSE
KING ASSUMED THAT, IN OUR MENTIONING IT TO HIM, HE WOULD
END UP WITH SOME MORE F-5E'S TO FILL HOLES IN HIS
PRESENT CONCEPT OF A FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR HIS
AIR FORCE. HE SEES THE SOVIET OFFER (APPARENTLY UP TO 24 HELI-
COPTERS AVAILABLE FOR "IMMEDIATE" DELIVERY AT A COST OF ABOUT
FROM \$1.0 MILLION TO \$400,000 EACH AS OPPOSED TO \$5-6 MILLION
EACH FOR US EQUIVALENTS) AS A WAY OF REVIVING OUR INTEREST
IN THE PROPOSITION. HIS HOPE IS STILL TO GET MORE FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT SOONER FROM US, EVEN THOUGH THE SHAH HAS BEEN
EXTREMELY GENEROUS IN GIVING HIM 30 EARLY MODEL F-5'S
AND KING CANNOT REALLY ABSORB WHAT HE HAS ON HAND AND
ON ORDER. HERE SOME SORT OF PITCH ALONG THE LINES
OF OUR SETTLEMENT ON THE HAWK DELIVERY PROBLEM MIGHT
HELP, I.E. -- "WE KNOW YOU DO NOT WANT AIRCRAFT ON HAND
THAT YOU CANNOT MAN. WE WILL LOOK AT WHAT WE CAN DO TO
SPEED UP YOUR ORDERS IF OUR JOINT STUDIES SHOW
YOU CAN REALLY ABSORB THEM EARLY." (NOT MUCH CHANCE
OF THAT HAPPENING IN OUR VIEW, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT
SURE KING KNOWS IT.) WE SHOULD THEN TRY TO HELP HIM

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00655 02 OF 03 081039Z

DISPOSE OF HIS AGING FLEET OF F-104'S WHICH HE COULD

SELL (ALL BUT ONE ARE FMS AIRCRAFT) AND TURN PROFITS INTO ADDITIONAL F-5E ORDERS. THUS FAR WE HAVE RECEIVED ONLY A PERFUNCTORY RESPONSE TO EFFORTS TO LOCATE A BUYER. WE SHOULD ALSO CLEAR THE AIR FOR GOOD ON THE VIETNAM EQUIPMENT ISSUE, INCLUDING THE SURPRISE INFORMATION (NOW WE KNOW DEFINITELY SUPPLIED BY NORTHROP) THAT THERE ARE 40 F-5E'S IN MOTHBALLS AT AN AIR BASE IN CALIFORNIA. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE QUICKLY ON THESE POINTS IN MY JUDGMENT, PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE THE TRIP.

7. AS FOR THE HELICOPTERS, WE SEE SEVERAL POSSIBLE OPTIONS:

(A) WE CAN REFUSE TO CHANGE OUR PRESENT POSITION -- RELEASE OF SIX HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS FOR COMMERCIAL SALE TO GOJ. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, GOJ WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE SOME FROM USSR. THEY MIGHT INITIALLY PUT THEM IN CIVIL AIR FLEET AND USE SOME OF THE SOVIET HELICOPTERS FOR TOURISM, RESCUE AND OTHER CIVIL PURPOSES. SINCE PRESENT CIVIL AIR FLEET ALSO INCLUDES ONE BOEING 707 NOW USED MAINLY AS LONG DISTANCE TRANSPORT, MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY ALSO MAKE HEAVY USE OF THE SOVIET HELICOPTERS. JORDANIANS WOULD GO THIS ROUTE PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY SEE NO READY SOURCE OF FUNDS FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR THE GULF TO BUY THE MORE EXPENSIVE US HELICOPTERS AND SECONDARILY BECAUSE THEY WOULD RESENT THE SMALL INITIAL RELEASE AND THE PROBABLE LONG LEAD TIMES FOR US EQUIPMENT. THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A SOVIET ROLE MIGHT BE MITIGATED IF WE COULD INDUCE JORDANIANS TO RESTRICT THEIR ACQUISITION TO PURELY "CIVIL" USE, BUT WE IMAGINE THE ISRAELIS WOULD EXPLOIT THE DEAL WITH THE CONGRESS AND THE SAUDIS WOULD BE RESENTFUL. SOVIET TECHNICIANS WOULD HAVE TO COME TO JORDAN AND JORDANIAN PILOTS TO THE USSR. IT OBVIOUSLY WOULD IMPACT NEGATIVELY (AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO KING) ON HAWK, OUR AID PROGRAMS AND THE SAUDIS.

(B) WE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER AN INITIAL NUMBER (4-6) OF CH-53 TYPE HELICOPTERS COULD BE PURCHASED FROM PRESENT US ASSETS AND WHETHER ADDITIONAL NUMBERS OF NEW

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00655 02 OF 03 081039Z

OR USED HELICOPTERS COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FOLLOW-ON GRANT OR CREDIT PROGRAMS. ONE VARIATION WOULD BE AN OFFER TO TRY TO INCREASE THE CREDIT ALLOCATION IN FUTURE YEARS TO COVER THE FOLLOW ON HELICOPTERS. SINCE WE ASSUME JORDAN CAN GET THE SAUDIS OR OTHERS TO REPAY THE CREDIT, IT WOULD COME TO THEM AS A GRANT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SOME PRICE ADJUSTMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON USED HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS ON THE BASIS OF WEAR THROUGH PREVIOUS SERVICE. THE OTHER

ADVANTAGE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE EARLIER DELIVERY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SUCH EQUIPMENT COULD BE TAKEN FROM US ASSETS AND PRESUME IT WOULD REQUIRE A MAJOR EFFORT ON OUR PART TO DO SO. SIMILARLY, SOME INCREASE IN FUTURE YEAR CREDIT WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A MAJOR EFFORT. SO AS A THIRD PART OF THIS OPTION WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER ALSO LETTING JORDANIANS KNOW IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS SORT OF OFFER THAT THEY SHOULD BE GUIDED IN MAKING A DECISION ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL PURCHASE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS ONLY FOR CIVIL USE BY THEIR OWN JUDGMENT OF THE DAMAGE IT WOULD DO TO THEM. BUT WE SHOULD ALSO TELL THEM AGAIN WHAT WE THINK WILL BE THE VERY SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE RULW FOR THEM IF THEY PURCHASE SOVIET MACHINES FOR

MILITARY PURPOSES. THE ADVANTAGES OF DOING THE ABOVE WOULD BE TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY AND FROM THE OUTSET ANY JORDANIAN LEVERAGE INHERENT IN THE THREAT TO GO SOVIET, AND ALSO SATISFY KING'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING WITH SOVIETS BY IMPLYING, BUT NOT SUGGESTING, A VCMCAVE COURSE OF ACTION WITH THE SOVIETS. THE PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH ARE THAT SOME EFFORT ON THE US SIDE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE AVAILABLE EARLY FROM INVENTORY HELICOPTERS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE, AND TO SEEK ADDITIONAL CREDIT.

(C) A FURTHER OPTION, SINCE JORDANIAN INTEREST IS IN ACQUIRING US EQUIPMENT THEY FEEL THEY CANNOT NOW AFFORD, IS FOR THE US TO INDICATE WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE SAUDIS IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING IMMEDIATE SAUDI FUNDING FOR SOX OR SO HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS ON A COMMERCIAL OR FMS CASH PURCHASE. THIS COULD ONLY PRESUMABLY BE DONE AFTER THE SAUDIS FINALLY AGREED TO THE HAWK SALE AND WOULD BE TOUGH SLEDDING FOR US. SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT BE COMBINED WITH A COMMITMENT TO SEEK ADDITIONAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00655 02 OF 03 081039Z

FMS CREDIT FOR JORDAN IN FUTURE YEARS FOR THE ADDITIONAL PURCHASE FOR SAY UP TO THREE HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS IN EACH OF TWO SUCCESSIVE YEARS FOR A TOTAL OF TWELVE. THIS WOULD ACCORD WITH A ROUGH JUDGMENT HERE ABOUT JORDAN'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, BUT IT COULD BE REFINED AFTER A LOOK AT A ROUGH CUT BY THE RJAF AT THEIR OWN STUDY OF THE PROBLEM WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE KING'S VISIT. WE SHOULD BY THEN ALSO HAVE A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF HAWK FUNDING. THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPTION IS THAT IT WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00655 03 OF 03 081041Z

21

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 110932

O 080700Z FEB 76 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6877

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 AMMAN 0655

NODIS

STADIS //////////////////////////////////////

CHANCE OF BLOCKING A JORDANIAN-SOVIET HELICOPTER DEAL --
ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE WE WOULD MATCH AND PROBABLY BEAT
THE SOVIET OFFER. THE DISADVANTAGES ARE OBVIOUS --
WE HAVE NOT WANTED FOR GOOD REASONS TO APPROACH THE
SAUDIS ON MATTERS OF THIS TYPE -- SINCE THE JORDANIANS
WILL, IF THEY SUCCEED WITH HAWK, HAVE OBTAINED ABOUT ALL
THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR (AT LEAST FOR THEM ACTING ALONE) FOR
THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF OUR
SUCCESS WITH THE SAUDIS GIVEN OUR OWN PROBLEMS, BUT THE
FUTURE YEAR CREDIT FUNDS WOULD ASSURE SOMETHING WAS POSSIBLE.

8. ELEMENTS OF THE ABOVE OPTIONS MIGHT BE COMBINED
AND REORDERED. AT A MINIMUM, THE JORDANIANS SHOULD BE
GIVEN SOME INDICATION WE TAKE THEIR INTEREST SERIOUSLY.

9. RECOMMENDATION: WE WOULD FAVOR SOMETHING ALONG THE
LINES OF OPTION B AS BEST CALCULATED TO MEET THEIR
NEEDS JSDDLDEDUCE, BUT NOT ELIMINATE, THE POSSIBILITY
OF SOVIET PRESENCE AND LEVERAGE. OPTION C WOULD BE A SECOND
AND FALLBACK CHOICE IF THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVED IT WAS WISE
HAD ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD AT A BARE
MINIMUM MAKE CLEAR WE ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE HELICOPTERS ON A
BASIS RELATED TO JORDAN'S CAPACITY TO ABSORB THEM, AND
ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE THEM IN OUR REGULAR ON-GOING
PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE ON THAT BASIS SHOULD JORDAN
ACCORD THEIR ACQUISITION HIGH ENOUGH PRIORITY. THIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00655 03 OF 03 081041Z

LATTER APPROACH WILL PROBABLY NOT HELP TO AVOID SOME ACQUISITION OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN OUR VIEW (ALTHOUGH PERHAPS IN A "CIVIL" FOLE ONLY) BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAN NOTHING.

10. IN SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, HOWEVER ILL-ADVISED WE AND THE DEPARTMENT MAY BELIEVE THE JORDANIANS ARE IN THIS LATEST FLIRTATION WITH THE SOVIETS, THEY APPEAR TO BE MAKING THE HELICOPTER ISSUE A CENTRAL QUESTION IN OUR RELATIONS. AS NOTED EARLIER, THEIR REACTION IS CLEARLY A COMBINATION OF THE KING'S FIXATION WITH ACQUIRING SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT AND HIS DESIRE CONSTANTLY TO BE REASSURED IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE US, RECENTLY FLAWED BY DOUBTS AND STRESSES. THERE IS IN THE PROCESS ALSO SOMETHING OF RIFAI'S PENCHANT FOR DIPLOMATIC RISK TAKING AND HIGH ROLLING AND THE KING'S SOMETHIMES SHORTSIGHTED VIEWS OF WHERE HIS FUTURE INTERESTS ARE TO BE BEST SERVED.

11. BECAUSE JORDAN HAS EMBARKED ON THIS COURSE, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY THROUGH AN EMOTIONAL REACTION PUSH THEMSELVES TO THE POINT WHERE THEY BELIEVE THE ONLY OPTION IS TO GO TO THE SOVIETS. I AM PERSONALLY NOT HAPPY WITH THE ELEMENTS OF BARGAINING IN THEIR APPROACH, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST REACT BY TREATING THE ISSUE SERIOUSLY. WE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS CONTINUE TO POINT OUT THE DANGERS TO THE KING THAT THIS COURSE OF ACTION WITH THE SOVIETS ENTAILS. I HAVE DONE SO ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS IN THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS. BUT WE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO GIVE THEM EVIDENCE THT WE ARE MAKING A STRENUOUS EFFORT TO TAKE THEIR NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT AND AT THE SAME TIME INDICATE THERE MAY BE OPTIONS WHICH DO NOT RULE OUT AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION. A SUFFICIENT COMBINATION OF INDUCEMENTS AND THREATS SHOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP ALIVE ALL OF THE JORDANIANS SUSPICIONS AND FEARS ABOUT THE SOVIET OFFER WHILE REASSURING THEM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT FOR THEM.
PICKERING

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, HELICOPTERS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: blochd0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976AMMAN00655
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P850107-2364
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760270/aaaacjux.tel
Line Count: 424
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, STADIS
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, STADIS
Reference: 76 AMMAN 604
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: blochd0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 OCT 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <15 JUN 2004 by izenbei0, 3.4.X6>; RELEASED <05 OCT 2004 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <01 NOV 2004 by blochd0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOVIET ARMS FOR JORDAN, US PROGRAMS AND HEAVE-LIFT HELICOPTERS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, OVIP, US, UR, JO, (HUSSEIN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006